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JUSTICIABILITY, FEDERALISM, AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Zachary D. Clopton†
Article III provides that the judicial power of the United
States extends to certain justiciable cases and controversies.
So if a plaintiff bringing a federal claim lacks constitutional
standing or her dispute is moot under Article III, then a federal
court should dismiss.  But this dismissal need not end the
story.  This Article suggests a simple, forward-looking reading
of case-or-controversy dismissals: they should be understood
as invitations to legislators to consider other pathways for
adjudication.  A case dismissed for lack of standing, for moot-
ness, or for requesting an advisory opinion might be a candi-
date for resolution in a state court or administrative agency.
And although the Supreme Court has frequently policed the
delegation of the “judicial power of the United States,” legisla-
tive delegations of non-justiciable claims should not trans-
gress those limits.  Instead, case-or-controversy dismissals
imply that non-Article III options are permissible.
This formulation is more than a doctrinal trick.  It has
normative consequences across a range of dimensions.  For
one thing, this approach reinvigorates the separation-of-pow-
ers purposes of justiciability doctrine by turning our attention
from judges to legislators.  When courts seemingly use jus-
ticiability to curtail private enforcement or access to justice, we
could re-interpret the results as revealing a legislative failure
to authorize non-Article III options.  More affirmatively, case-
or-controversy dismissals could be focal points for political
pressure in favor of more rigorous enforcement of important
laws that the federal executive may be shirking.  Further, con-
sistent with “new new federalist” accounts, this Article sug-
gests another avenue for federal-state interactivity in the
development and enforcement of federal law.  This too is of
added salience given that private and state enforcement may
become even more significant in light of the current occupants
of the federal executive branch.
† Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Thank you to Kevin Cler-
mont, Michael Dorf, Heather Elliott, Tara Leigh Grove, F. Andrew Hessick, Rich-
ard Re, Martin Redish, Allan Trammell, Chief Judge Diane P. Wood, and the
participants in the Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium for helpful discussions
in preparation of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III tells us that the judicial power of the United
States extends to certain justiciable cases and controversies.1
So if a plaintiff bringing a federal claim lacks constitutional
standing or her dispute is moot under Article III, then the fed-
eral court should dismiss.2  But this dismissal need not end the
story.3  This Article suggests a simple, forward-looking reading
of case-or-controversy dismissals: they should be understood
as invitations to legislators to consider other pathways for ad-
judication.  A case dismissed for lack of standing, for mootness,
or for requesting an advisory opinion may be a candidate for
resolution in a state court, an administrative agency, or a legis-
lative tribunal—and that choice is for legislators, not judges.4
None of this should be earthshattering.  After all, it derives
from just a couple sentences of the Constitution.5  Yet it runs
counter to much of the rhetoric that surrounds Article III juris-
prudence.  Critics have referred to justiciability doctrine as a
“pointless constraint on courts,”6 as “an insupportable judicial
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 See infra subpart I.A.
3 This Article uses the term “dismissal” loosely in two respects.  First, some-
times the “dismissal” will be a remand order—cases removed to federal court
when there is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction should be remanded to state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018).  Second, when the decision has precedential
effect, it might operate as a potential invitation to the class of cases for which it
has an effect.
4 Bringing together state courts, administrative agencies, and legislative
tribunals is consistent with—but does not depend on—Justice Brandeis’s com-
mentary on the judicial power in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)
(dissenting).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
6 Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007).
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contraction of the legislative power,”7 and, straightforwardly,
as “making it more difficult to implement federal laws.”8  Critics
present doomsday scenarios in which important laws gov-
erning the environment, consumer protection, and civil rights
will go unenforced,9 and in particular that “private enforce-
ment” of federal law will be neutered.10
Such concerns run up to the present day.  In 2016, the
Supreme Court decided two private-enforcement cases raising
issues under Article III: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (standing)11 and
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (mootness).12  Prior to the death
of Justice Scalia, one critic characterized these cases as asking
“whether the conservative wing of the Roberts Court will re-
spect our Constitution’s guarantee of access to courts or sub-
vert it, leaving Americans without legal recourse when
corporations violate federal rights.”13  And although an eight-
member Court declined to issue far-reaching holdings,14 Don-
ald Trump’s appointments to the Supreme Court may reinvigo-
rate these concerns.15
While I may share many of the critics’ normative priors
(and many of their interpretations of Article III), the rhetoric
about federal rights is overheated because it is too focused on
the federal courts.  If we treat Article III dismissals as reflecting
the separation of powers—as the Supreme Court tells us we
should16—then concerns about under-enforcement should be
directed at legislators too.  Federal and state legislatures can
provide “legal recourse” outside of Article III courts.  And al-
though the Supreme Court has frequently policed the delega-
tion of the “judicial Power of the United States,” legislative
delegations of non-justiciable claims should not transgress
7 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judi-
cially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170–71 (1993).
8 Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 303 (2005).
9 See, e.g., supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text; infra notes 13–14, R
50–51, 95–97 and accompanying text. R
10 See infra note 49 and accompanying text (“private enforcement”). R
11 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). See infra subpart III.A.
12 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016). See infra subpart III.B.
13 David Gans, No Day in Court: Big Business’s Attack on Access to Courts,
BALKINIZATION (Oct. 9, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/10/no-day-in-
court-big-businesss-attack-on.html [https://perma.cc/2NC6-26T3].
14 Despite the modesty of the Spokeo holding, one critic observed its contribu-
tion to standing law “seems to be serving no purpose other than to constitutional-
ize a deregulatory agenda.”  Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 440 (2017).
15 See infra notes 23 & 25 (identifying vehicles to reconsider these issues). R
16 See infra Part I.
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those limits.17  An Article III dismissal cuts out federal courts
but also leaves open non-Article III options that respect judicial
power limits.
This formulation is more than a doctrinal trick or a sugges-
tion that critics of the Supreme Court should speak more pre-
cisely.  It also maps out an institutional strategy for preserving
important federal rights.  First, imagine a President and a Su-
preme Court hostile to regulation and enforcement, and a Con-
gress gridlocked or otherwise inactive.  In this scenario,
progressive states might look to their courts for opportunities
to encourage enforcement of those rights that the federal exec-
utive is ignoring and the federal courts are retrenching.  Next,
imagine that four years later the federal political branches be-
come more amenable to regulation and enforcement, but an
entrenched Supreme Court with life-tenured justices is holding
fast.  In this scenario, a Congress intent on restoring enforce-
ment baselines might see state courts and administrative agen-
cies as a means to avoid the obstacles created by the federal
courts.  These two accounts depend on a reading of Article III
that has escaped sustained scholarly attention.
Fleshing out this vision, this Article proceeds as follows.
The first step is to look at Article III itself: what does the case-
or-controversy requirement entail, and how does it interact
with the Constitution’s vesting of the judicial power in the fed-
eral courts.18  This discussion precipitates the simple reading
of Article III mentioned above—that is, that case-or-controversy
dismissals invite legislative action.19  This Article next looks
outside of Article III for potential limits on the legislative re-
sponses that such dismissals invite.20  The Constitution cer-
tainly places some limits on these options, though they derive
from sources other than Article III.  In addition, institutional
design considerations should shape the potential legislative
choice between state-court and administrative resolution of
non-Article III disputes.
This Article then applies the dismissal-as-invitation thesis,
beginning with the two aforementioned cases decided by the
Supreme Court in 2016.  First, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,21 the
Court asked whether Congress may create the injury that pro-
17 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; infra Part I.
18 This Article is agnostic on the scope of the case-or-controversy requirement
itself.  I assume that such a requirement exists, and then ask what should be
done with claims that fall outside of it.
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra subpart III.A.
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vides the basis for federal-court standing in a Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (FCRA) case.22  The Spokeo decision was measured,
but it indicated some appetite to curtail congressionally cre-
ated standing.23  Consistent with this Article’s thesis, were a
court to conclude that Congress cannot create the necessary
standing, the result would not be an end to private enforcement
of the FCRA but instead an invitation for administrative or
state-court resolution of FCRA claims without fear of offending
the dignity of the federal courts.
Second, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,24 the Court con-
sidered whether an offer of judgment that moots the claim of a
named plaintiff in a class action also moots the claims of the
rest of the class.  Although the Court declined to find mootness
on these facts, it left open other possibilities to undercut pri-
vate enforcement, and the Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion
suggested that there was some enthusiasm for further restrict-
ing the justiciability of federal class actions.25  Again, consis-
tent with this Article’s thesis, judicial decisions finding class
actions to be moot would be an invitation for administrative or
state-court resolution of these disputes.
Finally, this Article considers options for Congress and
state legislatures to create general statutes providing for non-
Article III review of non-justiciable federal claims.26  This Arti-
cle explores not only how legislatures could do so, but why they
might.  This approach is particularly significant when some
states (and eventually federal legislators) may be more inter-
ested in regulation and enforcement than the President and the
Supreme Court.
The conclusions of this Article connect with two significant
strains in recent legal scholarship.  First, there has been in-
creasing attention on private enforcement as a tool of federal
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
23 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1553 (2016).  Since Spokeo,
the courts of appeals have continued to give the Supreme Court opportunities to
take up this question. See, e.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 630 (D.C.
Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (holding that the risk of identity theft
was an injury that satisfied Article III); Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 507 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 447 (2017) (holding that an informational
injury under the FCRA satisfied Article III). See also infra note 183. R
24 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016). See infra subpart III.B.
25 Here too, the next opportunity to test these issues may come soon. See,
e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leyse v. Lifetime Entm’t Servs., 138 S. Ct. 637
(2018) (No. 17-162) (seeking certiorari to determine whether a defendant’s deposit
of an offer of judgment renders a case moot). See also infra note 207. R
26 See infra subpart III.C. Cf. Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve
Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 205 (2011) (minimizing Congress’s op-
tions for expanding standing).
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(and state) policy.27  Particular attention has been paid to the
ways that the federal courts have impeded private-enforcement
efforts, including through increased scrutiny on Article III’s
requirements.  By reorienting the focus away from federal
courts, this Article minimizes the supposedly negative effects of
Article III doctrine for private enforcement.  In addition, this
Article’s recognition of state options interacting with federal
standards aligns with the “new new federalist” emphasis on
federal–state opportunities.28  This Article emphasizes those
opportunities as they relate to private litigation and enforce-
ment, rather than the lawmaking focus that dominates that
literature.  In the context of private enforcement, federalism
presents interesting potential for state implementation around
national focal points.29  This connection of private enforcement
and federalism is especially important as the Trump adminis-
tration is unlikely to be a major source of public enforcement
across a range of important issues—though, of course, private
enforcement and federalism transcend any one presidential
administration.
Before diving in, one brief caveat is in order.  This Article
does not address non-justiciable suits against federal defend-
ants.  Most prominently, this means that it excludes challenges
to the constitutionality of federal statutes.  Decisions like Clin-
ton v. City of New York30 and INS v. Chadha31 suggest that it
would be impermissible to give an administrative or legislative
tribunal the ability to alter statutes outside of the normal law-
making process, and decisions like Cooper v. Aaron32 reject
state nullification of federal law.  Those decisions would be
among the “non-Article III limits” addressed below,33 but be-
cause they implicate an important class of cases in its entirety,
I mention them separately here.  This Article also excludes
suits against other federal defendants, which may raise special
27 See infra notes 49–50, 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing private R
enforcement).
28 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Over-
view, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (providing an overview of the “nationalist
school of federalism”); Symposium, Federalism as the New Nationalism, 123 YALE
L.J. 1888 (2014) (same).
29 See infra subpart III.C.
30 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
31 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
32 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
33 See infra Part II.
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federalism and separation-of-powers issues beyond the scope
of this project.34
In sum, the goal of this project is to reinvigorate the sepa-
ration-of-powers mission of Article III, and perhaps to import a
federalism dimension as well.  This means that case-or-contro-
versy dismissals should be properly treated not as defeats for
legislative goals but as invitations for legislative creativity.  And
it means that those parties interested in vigorous enforcement
of federal law should not be overly distracted by fights about
federal-court access (or federal-executive policy) to the exclu-
sion of alternatives that derive from the principles of federalism
and the separation of powers.35  Importantly, this Article does
not endorse the Supreme Court’s recent decisions tightening
standing or other justiciability doctrines—instead, it suggests
that those decisions are not the end of the story.36
I
ARTICLE III
For present purposes, Article III contains two important
substantive commands.  Section 1 provides that “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”37  Section 2 further devel-
ops this command by stating that the judicial power shall ex-
tend to certain cases or controversies.38  The federal courts
34 These federal-defendant claims seem to be subject to resolution in admin-
istrative or legislative tribunals, and many of them would be acceptable candi-
dates for state-court resolution as well.  But because those conclusions would
entail more detailed discussion of separation-of-powers and federalism doctrine, I
exclude those cases from this Article’s reach.
35 Of course, this conclusion has a political dimension—it depends on legisla-
tors responding to some of these invitations.  Acknowledging that those responses
may not always be forthcoming, I address these concerns with respect to federal
and state legislators separately.
36 For example, this Article looks at the Court’s current conception of Article
III rather than the alternative, historical account offered in James E. Pfander &
Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-
Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015).
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States will be a
Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens
of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN607.txt unknown Seq: 8 20-NOV-18 13:44
1438 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1431
have principally understood these commands as reflecting the
Framers’ concerns with the separation of powers.39
This Part puts these two commands together.  Subpart A
briefly surveys the operation of the case-or-controversy re-
quirement in federal courts.  Subpart B reads the case-or-con-
troversy requirement to suggest that Congress has the power to
provide for resolution of disputes that are not quite cases or
controversies through various alternative channels.  Subpart C
then pivots back to the text of Article III and asks whether its
vesting clause places any limits on those alternative channels.
Taken together, these provisions establish the central conten-
tion of this Article: Article III invites Congress to provide for the
resolution of certain federal claims outside of the federal
courts.
A. Cases and Controversies
In order for the federal courts to take jurisdiction, they
must identify a “case” or “controversy” within the heads of ju-
risdiction in Article III.40  In applying these requirements, the
federal courts have fashioned various doctrines to weed out
non-justiciable claims.
Perhaps the most debated such requirement is “stand-
ing.”41  Modern federal standing doctrine has three elements:
an injury in fact, which is both concrete and particularized,
and actual or imminent; a causal connection such that the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and a likeli-
hood of redressability by a favorable decision.42  Standing thus
attempts to ensure that the parties match the subject matter of
the dispute.43  The Supreme Court has been emphatic about
39 See infra subparts I.A and I.C.
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (quoted in relevant part supra note 38). R
41 See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN L. REV.
459 (2008) (discussing the functions and failures of the standing doctrine); Wil-
liam A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (proposing a
new structure of standing law focused on the merits of plaintiff’s claim); F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275
(2008) (arguing the Supreme Court’s injury-in-fact requirement in private rights
cases undermines separation of powers); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia,
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993) (describing Justice
Scalia’s role in the development of standing public law litigation); Cass R. Sun-
stein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (evaluating standing doctrine after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife).
42 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (outlining the
elements of Article III standing).
43 As this description suggests, decisions on standing are seemingly case-
and party-specific, but it is conceivable that some arguments on standing have
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the basis of standing: “the law of Art. III standing is built on a
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”44
I should pause for a moment to elaborate this connection
to the separation of powers, which has shifted meanings in the
Supreme Court’s justiciability jurisprudence.  On the one
hand, in the Lujan decision, the Court suggested that standing
doctrine stops Congress from encroaching on the executive’s
duty to take care that the laws are enforced.45  But in cases
before and after Lujan—including in Spokeo46—the Supreme
Court confirmed the more orthodox view of standing’s relation-
ship to separation of powers, i.e., that it manifests separation-
of-powers constraints on federal courts.47  Indeed, even Lujan’s
author Justice Scalia adopted this court-constraining view of
standing law in his opinion in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment.48
the practical effect of rendering a class of cases non-justiciable in general. See,
e.g., Zachary Clopton, Emoluments and Justiciability, TAKE CARE (June 26, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/emoluments-and-justiciability [https://
perma.cc/YT4P-4CRF].
44 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1459–61
(1988) (describing the role of the separation of powers in the development of the
standing doctrine for private-law disputes).
45 504 U.S. at 577 (“If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-
powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ com-
pliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.’”); see also Fletcher, supra note 41, at 233 (“Where standing to enforce R
statutorily established duties is at issue, an ‘injury in fact’ requirement operates
as a limitation on the power normally exercised by a legislative body.”); Tara Leigh
Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781,
785 (2009) (offering an Article II theory of standing) Michael C. Dorf, Supreme
Court Requires “Concrete” Injury for Standing, VERDICT (May 18, 2016), https://ver
dict.justia.com/2016/05/18/supreme-court-requires-concrete-injury-standing
[https://perma.cc/886F-AET6] (“Congressional authorization of private lawsuits
to compel enforcement could . . . be seen as an effort to shift power from the
president to Congress.  Accordingly, prior standing cases expressly invoke separa-
tion of powers.”).
46 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). Spokeo cited a footnote
from Raines v. Byrd, which is appended to the phrase: “In the light of this overrid-
ing and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its
proper constitutional sphere . . . .”  521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997).  The two other cases
cited by Spokeo are equally clear that Article III is about constraining the courts.
See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Gladstone, Realtors v.
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
47 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (collecting cases).
48 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (“Our opinion is not motivated . . . by the more
specific separation-of-powers concern that this citizen’s suit somehow interferes
with the Executive’s power to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.  The
courts must stay within their constitutionally prescribed sphere of action,
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In any event, in recent years, the federal courts have nar-
rowed standing doctrine for private claims, raising the ire par-
ticularly of those worried about the private enforcement of
federal law.  Across a range of issues, Congress has empowered
private attorneys general to enforce federal statutory rights.49
Scholars have called out the Supreme Court’s standing deci-
sions as impediments to private enforcement generally,50 while
environmental and consumer advocates have expressed partic-
ular concern about standing in private suits on those
subjects.51
If standing is about parties, ripeness and mootness are
about timing.  Ripeness asks if a dispute is sufficiently devel-
oped to invoke the power of the federal courts.52  Though many
well known ripeness cases involve suits to stop the enforce-
ment of statutes or regulations,53 ripeness principles apply in
private civil litigation as well.54  The doctrine of mootness,
whether or not exceeding that sphere will harm one of the other two branches.
This case calls for nothing more than a straightforward application of our stand-
ing jurisprudence, which, though it may sometimes have an impact on Presiden-
tial powers, derives from Article III and not Article II.”) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1146 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-
powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp
the powers of the political branches.”).
49 For sources describing the development and scope of private enforcement
in American law, see generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) (analyz-
ing the counterrevolution against private enforcement of rights); SEAN FARHANG,
THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010);
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Ap-
proach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2002); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69
VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016) [hereinafter Redundant Enforcement]; William B. Ruben-
stein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is-And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 2129 (2004); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforce-
ment: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV.
93 (2005).
50 See, e.g., BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 49. R
51 For a discussion of consumer law, see infra subpart III.A.  For the environ-
ment, see, for example, Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the
Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111 (2007).
52 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 212–37 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER] (explaining the ripeness doctrine); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365 (1973) (discussing
ripeness and related doctrines); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitu-
tion, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 161–64 (1987) (reviewing the ripeness doctrine).
53 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 137 (1967) (addressing
regulations under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
54 See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007)
(appealing dismissal of declaratory judgment claims between patent licensee and
licensor).
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meanwhile, asks whether a case is “too late” for judicial deter-
mination.55  Though subject to exceptions, a case “becomes
moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effec-
tual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”56  So, for example,
a plaintiff’s acceptance of an offer of judgment moots a dispute
because there is no live controversy remaining.57
Much like standing, Article III ripeness and mootness have
their roots in the courts’ role in the federal separation of pow-
ers.58  When courts take cases too soon or too late, they risk
“intrud[ing] upon powers vested in the legislative or executive
branches.  Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation
of powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues, be-
tween litigants, capable of effective determination.”59
Federal courts also have held that certain cases are non-
justiciable because they present political questions.60  Political
55 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at 195–212 (reviewing the R
mootness doctrine); Don B. Kates Jr. & William T. Barker, Mootness in Judicial
Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1385, 1401–12 (1974)
(providing an overview of the mootness doctrine); Monaghan, supra note 52, at R
1383–86 (explaining the development of the mootness doctrine).
56 Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012)).
57 See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532
(2013).
58 See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 206–07
(2012) (discussing when separation-of-powers considerations make abstention
appropriate); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (noting
that the separation-of-powers limit courts to hearing only cases and controver-
sies); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–52, 759–60 (1984) (explaining separa-
tion-of-powers concerns prevented a finding of standing).
59 United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90–91 (1947).
60 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at 237–66 (reviewing the R
political question doctrine); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall
of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 237, 244 (2002) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s application of the political
question doctrine over time); Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1915 (2015) (explaining the develop-
ment of the political question doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1985) (arguing that the political
question doctrine should not play a role in judicial review).
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court identified six factors that characterize
political questions:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the poten-
tiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
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questions include the methods of amending the Constitution,61
presidential authority to terminate treaties,62 the republican
form of government guarantee,63 and Senate authority with
respect to impeachment.64  And again, the political-question
doctrine is about respect for the coordinate branches—it is
“essentially a function of the separation of powers.”65
Finally, Article III is variously understood to require finality
and adversariness.66  For example, federal courts refuse to
hear cases subject to political-branch revision,67 and Chief
Justice John Jay famously wrote to President George Washing-
ton to decline his invitation to give an advisory opinion.68
These limits, too, are linked to the courts’ position in the fed-
eral separation of powers.69
B. Case-or-Controversy Dismissals
A finding of non-justiciability means that the federal-court
suit should end (soon).70  But that finding does not necessarily
mean the end of the dispute, and it should not mean the end of
the enforcement regime.  My repeated references to the separa-
tion-of-powers origins of the case-or-controversy requirement
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
61 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
62 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
63 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
64 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
65 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  There is some debate about whether the federal
political question doctrine necessarily applies in state courts. See, e.g., Backman
v. Sec’y of Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 526–28 (Mass. 1982) (explaining the
role of political question doctrine in Massachusetts); Lawrence Gene Sager, Insu-
lar Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1400–01 (1978) (discussing justiciability
doctrines in state courts).  The arguments against this application are strong, and
they are strongest in the non-federal defendant cases that comprise the focus of
this article.  But this is a separate issue from whether state courts may voluntarily
incorporate federal political-question principles.
66 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at 81–95 (providing an overview R
of finality and adversariness requirements). But see United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 754–63 (2013) (characterizing adversariness as a prudential, not
constitutional, requirement).
67 See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792).
68 See Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s34.html [https:/
/perma.cc/U92L-U38R].
69 See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at R
81–95; Letter from John Jay, supra note 68. R
70 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at 204–06 (discussing vacatur R
after mootness).
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is not just a mantra—it also highlights a set of responses to
case-or-controversy dismissals from outside of Article III.71
Take standing.  When a federal court concludes that a par-
ticular plaintiff has not suffered an “injury in fact” such that
she may sue to enforce a federal statute, the court says nothing
about whether such a suit would be viable in a state court,
administrative agency, or legislative tribunal.72  More gener-
ally, when a federal court interprets Article III to imply any
plaintiff bringing a certain type of claim would lack standing,
the court says nothing about whether such suits would be
viable in state courts, administrative agencies, or legislative
tribunals.73
First, federal statutes are regularly enforced in state
courts.  Prior to Reconstruction, there was no grant of general
federal-question jurisdiction,74 so many federal-law claims
were adjudicated in state courts.75  Today, many statutes ex-
pressly provide for concurrent jurisdiction,76 and the Supreme
Court has held that state courts must enforce federal law on
the same level as analogous state law.77  Moreover, state courts
are not obligated to follow federal standing rules.78  In ASARCO
v. Kadish, the Supreme Court made clear that state courts may
71 See supra note 3 (discussing “dismissals”). R
72 See generally Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative
and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 234 (1990) (explain-
ing various approaches to justify non-Article III tribunals); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV.
915, 933–49 (1988) (applying the “appellate review” theory to justify non-article III
tribunals); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 671–97 (2004) (discussing the
history of and justification for Article I tribunals).
73 See Fallon, supra note 72, at 933–49.
74 “An Act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States,
and to regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other purposes.”
18 Stat. 470, ch. 137 (Mar. 3, 1875).  There is a slight exception under the brief
reign of the Judiciary Act of 1801. See, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Feder-
alism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 207 (2012).
75 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74
VA. L. REV. 1141, 1154 (1988); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506 (1928).  This
long history also implies that there should be no Article I problem stemming
merely from the fact that Congress adopted a federal statute enforced only in state
court.
76 See, e.g., infra subpart III.A (discussing the FCRA and presumption of
concurrency).
77 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
78 Then-Professor William A. Fletcher argued that “[s]tate courts should be
required to adhere to article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements whenever they
adjudicate questions of federal law.” The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in
State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1990).
But as explained shortly, that is not the law.
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adjudicate federal claims that would not satisfy the case-or-
controversy requirement if brought in federal court.79  Many
states in fact have standing rules looser than Article III.80
Therefore, when Article III standing is not available and a state
has more liberal standing rules, plaintiffs who file federal
claims in state courts may proceed without fear of an Article III
dismissal (or a successful removal to federal court).81
For example, claims for civil rights violations under the
highly important (and often contentious) Section 1983 may be
brought in federal or state courts.82  Of course, Section 1983
suits in federal court are subject to Article III standing, but
what if such suits are brought in state court?  In Keyhea v.
Rushen, for example, California taxpayers sued under Section
1983 alleging third-party harms to prisoners from the use of
psychotropic drugs against their will.83  Taxpayer standing for
1983 claims is unavailable in federal court, but permissible in
California state court.84  As a result, plaintiffs were able to
press their federal claim in state court despite lacking a feder-
ally justiciable case or controversy.85  Of course, this assumes
a federal statute with concurrent jurisdiction and a state with
79 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized
often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accord-
ingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or
other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law,
as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a
federal statute.”).
80 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethink-
ing the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1852–59 (2001) (comparing
federal standing rules with standing rules in state courts); F. Andrew Hessick,
Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 65–68 (2015) (explain-
ing the variance between state and federal standing doctrine).  For an example
that got the attention of the Supreme Court, see Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654,
667–70 (2003) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that California’s un-
fair-competition law allowed a private attorney general to sue Nike for misrepre-
sentations regarding foreign working conditions in state court even though
plaintiff would not have been able to establish Article III standing).
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2018).  I situate these responses within a broader
framework in Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106
CAL. L. REV. 411 (2018).
82 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 731 (2009); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents
of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 506–07 (1982); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980).
83 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (1992).
84 See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 526a (Deering 2017).
85 Ultimately, the plaintiffs did not prevail on their Section 1983 claim, but
they were able to obtain attorney fees under Section 1988 because their success-
ful state-law claim was factually related to the federal claim. See Keyhea, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 762.
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broad standing law.86  Why Congress and a state might operate
in this way is taken up below.87
In addition to state-court resolution, when a federal court
dismisses a suit for lack of standing, Congress could under-
stand this dismissal as an invitation to create a non-Article III
federal process.  Most prominently, agency adjudication is not
subject to the strictures of Article III standing.  In the words of
the D.C. Circuit, “[w]ithin their legislative mandates, agencies
are free to hear actions brought by parties who might be with-
out party standing if the same issues happened to be before a
federal court.”88  In Ritchie v. Simpson, for example, William
Richie was able to challenge O.J. Simpson’s applications to
register the trademarks O.J. SIMPSON, O.J., and THE JUICE
as immoral and scandalous in the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (TTAB) merely on the basis of Ritchie’s claim to be a
“family man” who believed that the “sanctity of marriage re-
quires a husband and wife who love and nurture one an-
86 Indeed, some state courts have applied federal standing principles in state
Section 1983 cases on the theory that federal standing doctrine inhered to the
federal statute. See, e.g., STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE
COURTS § 6.4 (2016) (collecting examples of states mirroring and not mirroring
federal pleading standards for Section 1983 claims in state courts).
87 See infra Part III.  Though not adjudicating a federal statutory cause of
action, another useful illustration of the state-court option arose in Envtl. World
Watch, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C05-1799 TEH, 2005 WL 1867728 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 3, 2005).  California’s Proposition 65 required businesses that operate or sell
products in California to warn their employees if they were exposed to certain
chemicals, and it broadened state standing doctrine to permit suits by private
parties “in the public interest.” Id. at *3.  Taking advantage of Prop 65, Environ-
ment World Watch (EWW) filed suit in state court against various airlines operat-
ing in California, even though EWW had not suffered any injury in fact.  The
airline defendants removed the case to federal court, but because EWW lacked
Article III standing, the case was remanded to state court. Id.  What makes this
case noteworthy is that one of those airline defendants was the state-owned
airline of New Zealand.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act purportedly pro-
vides federal-court jurisdiction for suits against foreign sovereigns, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330 (2018), but because of the Article III problem, the New Zealand airline was
forced to defend that case in state court.
88 Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1090 (1976). See also Pittsburgh & W. Va.
R.R. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 486 (1930) (“The mere fact that appellant
was permitted to intervene before the [administrative agency] does not entitle it to
institute an independent suit [in federal court] to set aside the [agency’s] order in
the absence of resulting actual or threatened legal injury to it.”); HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 118 (1973) (noting the various
factors that “negate any general rule linking a person’s standing to seek judicial
review to the fact that he has been allowed to intervene before the agency”); 13A
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 3531.13, at 80 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (“Administrative agencies are
not established under Article III and should not be bound by judicial rules of
standing in determining what parties to admit to adjudicatory or rulemaking
proceedings, any more than they are bound by other judicial rules of procedure.”).
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other.”89  It is hard to imagine Ritchie convincing a federal
court that he should have Article III standing to challenge the
applications, but the Federal Circuit concluded that this was
sufficient to proceed in the TTAB.90  Similarly, in proceedings
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission91 to the Fed-
eral Communications Commission92 to the Department of the
Interior,93 plaintiffs have gained access to administrative adju-
dication without complying with Article III.  Legislative courts
also could be made available, insulated from Article III stand-
ing, should Congress so choose.94
These non-Article III options have particular salience in
light of recent decisions on private enforcement.  During the
second half of the 20th century, Congress has relied heavily on
private parties to enforce various federal statutes.  Professors
Burbank and Farhang (and others) have documented the
trend—and associated backlash.95  The thrust of their argu-
ment is that the Supreme Court has been more effective than
Congress in rolling back the private-enforcement revolution.96
However, had previous congresses created non-Article III
mechanisms to go along with private-enforcement rights, at-
tempts to limit enforcement through justiciability doctrine
would have fallen short.97
89 Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
90 Id.
91 E.g., Ecee, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 645 F.2d 339, 349–50
(5th Cir. 1981).
92 E.g., Gardner, 530 F.2d at 1090–91.
93 E.g., Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 605–08 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  For
another interesting example, note that any person—not only one alleging an in-
jury in fact—can file a complaint of judicial misconduct with the Judicial Council
of the circuit courts. E.g., In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 9 F.3d 1562
(U.S. Jud. Conf. 1993).
94 See supra note 72. R
95 See supra note 49 (collecting work of Burbank, Farhang, and others). See R
also, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms
in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
96 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 49.  In other words, previous congresses’ R
efforts to entrench their substantive preferences through private enforcement
were thwarted by the courts’ ability to close their doors.  For more on intertem-
poral preferences, see infra note 238 and accompanying text. R
97 In the wake of various standing decisions that seemed to hamper the
private enforcement of environmental statutes, an occasional commentator would
call for the creation of non-Article III tribunals to handle environmental claims.
See, e.g., Preston Carter, Note, “If an (Endangered) Tree Falls in the Forest, and No
One Is Around . . . .”: Resolving the Divergence Between Standing Requirements &
Congressional Intent in Environmental Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2191,
2212–22 (2009); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposals for Congressional
Response to Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675, 684–89
(1989); Timothy C. Hodits, Note, The Fatal Flaw of Standing: A Proposal for an
Article I Tribunal for Environmental Claims, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1907, 1907 (2006);
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN607.txt unknown Seq: 17 20-NOV-18 13:44
2018] JUSTICIABILITY, FEDERALISM 1447
Case-or-controversy dismissals for reasons other than
standing also might be understood as calls for Congress to act.
Sometimes Congress may create statutory schemes that re-
quire judgments that appear advisory or non-final.98  If a fed-
eral court were to reject such an approach on Article III
grounds, Congress could create an administrative or legislative
tribunal to do the work.  For example, for most of its history,
Court of Claims judges handled both independent suits against
the government and so-called congressional-references cases,
in which they issued advisory opinions over which Congress
had final say.99  In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, the Supreme Court
confirmed that the Court of Claims was an Article III tribu-
nal.100  Following Glidden, the Article III judges of the Claims
Court refused to issue advisory opinions in congressional-ref-
erence cases.  Rather than despair the loss of those determina-
tions, Congress simply assigned the work to Article I
commissioners instead.101  Similarly, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act authorizes agencies to issue “declaratory judg-
ments,”102 and Article III does not seem to require those
proceedings to involve justiciable cases or controversies.103
State courts, too, could hear “advisory opinion” cases under
federal law if consistent with state justiciability principles.104
Finally, one could imagine similar patterns for mootness
and ripeness, though as discussed below, ripeness may pre-
David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionality of Citizen Suits
in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 308 (2007). See also
Elliott, supra note 26, at 206 (arguing against such proposals). R
98 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. R
99 See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 72, at 657, 704–05. R
100 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
101 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, sec. 105,
§ 171(b) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-77 (2000)).
102 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2018) (“The agency, with like effect as in the case of
other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to termi-
nate a controversy or remove uncertainty.”).
103 See, e.g., Cent. Freight Lines v. I.C.C., 899 F.2d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that it is “well established that the case or controversy requirement of
Article III does not restrict an agency’s authority to issue declaratory rulings
under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e)”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Emily S.
Bremer, The Agency Declaratory Judgment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1169 (2017).  Indeed,
it would be odd to suggest that Article III applied to agency declaratory proceed-
ings but not to other agency adjudications.
104 See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 620 (1989) (noting “established
traditions and . . . prior decisions recognizing that the state courts are not bound
by Article III and yet have it within both their power and their proper role to render
binding judgments on issues of federal law, subject only to review by this Court”);
id. at 636 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the
“unremarkable proposition . . . [that] state courts render advisory decisions on
federal law of no binding force even within the State”).
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sent a special concern not present for other justiciability
doctrines.105
C. The Judicial Power of the United States
Stated simply, the previous subpart suggests that a case-
or-controversy dismissal could be understood as an opportu-
nity for non-Article III resolution.  But observers of federal
courts might have a sneaking suspicion that this claim is too
bold.  For various textual, historical, and functional reasons,
the Supreme Court has placed limits on the types of disputes
that Congress may assign to non-Article III tribunals, and
these limits have generated significant judicial and scholarly
attention.  One might think, therefore, that these limits also
should cut back on my dismissal-as-invitation thesis.  To bet-
ter understand this issue, this subpart surveys the jurispru-
dential landscape with respect to the judicial power,106 and
then explains why (for the most part) it should not affect the
disputes described in this Article.
In addition to the case-or-controversy requirement (and
other provisions not relevant here107), Article III establishes an
important limit on federal dispute resolution when it provides
that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”108  Under-
stood as an important bulwark of the separation of powers,109
the vesting clause seems to imply a mandatory rule—by using
“shall,” the Constitution declares that the judicial power may
be exercised only by the federal judicial branch.110  Although a
few recent scholars have aspired to Article III literalism,111 his-
tory seems to cut the other way.  Military, territorial, and pub-
lic-rights disputes have been adjudicated outside of Article III
105 See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. R
106 For a curious reader, then-Judge Gorsuch surveyed much of the history in
In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp., 792 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2015).
107 Article III, Section 2 also addresses original jurisdiction and criminal cases;
Article III, Section 3 addresses treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 2–3.
108 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
109 See infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text. R
110 Shall is typically understood as mandatory.  See, for example, Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661–62 (2007); Lopez v. Davis,
531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,
523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998), though not always, for example, Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005). See also A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 114 (2012) (“[W]hen the word shall can reason-
ably read as mandatory, it ought to be so read.”).
111 See Pfander, supra note 72, at n.8 (collecting sources). R
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for centuries, though Murray’s Lessee teaches the default rule
that Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . .”112
More recent decisions have explored the line between those
cases or controversies that can and cannot be adjudicated
outside of Article III.  In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court
adopted a so-called categorical approach based on the history
of non-Article III tribunals,113 though the Court quickly aban-
doned this method in favor of a balancing approach presaged in
Justice White’s Northern Pipeline dissent.114  In Schor, the
Court explained that federal courts must balance the goals of
Congress with the need for an independent judiciary to
“determin[e] the extent to which a given congressional decision
to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-
Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional in-
tegrity of the Judicial Branch.”115  In Granfinanciera, Justice
Brennan suggested a correspondence between Article III and
the Seventh Amendment, which preserved the jury right for
suits at common law.116
The Roberts Court addressed the federal judicial power in a
pair of cases arising out of bankruptcy proceedings.  First, in
Stern, the Supreme Court again reiterated the existence of
some “public rights” disputes that could find a non-Article III
home, but also concluded that mere characterization of a case
as related to a public right was not enough: “[Congress] may no
more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch
than it may eliminate it entirely.”117  Finally, in 2015, the Su-
preme Court in Wellness International recalled Schor’s concern
with “institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”118  The
majority in Wellness International concluded that Congress
had not attempted to “aggrandize itself or humble the Judici-
ary” by providing for non-Article III adjudication of cases or
controversies.119  Again relying on Schor, the Court commented
that the law was far from the extreme scenario presented by
112 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1855).
113 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–70
(1982).
114 Id. at 113–16.
115 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
116 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64 (1989).
117 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502–03 (2011).
118 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
119 Id. at 1945.
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detractors: it was not as if “Congress created a phalanx of non-
Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of
the Article III courts without any Article III supervision or con-
trol and without evidence of valid and specific legislative
necessities.”120
Upon first glance, the proposal to treat case-or-controversy
dismissals as invitations for non-Article III adjudication seems
to fit within this long-running debate, so readers might expect
here an explanation why adjudicating these cases outside of
the federal courts would fit in some historical category or would
satisfy the Court’s balancing test.  But, the judicial power limit
does not affect the jurisdiction of state courts, and even for
non-Article III federal tribunals, my thesis avoids this debate
altogether.121  The issues described in the preceding
paragraphs address when Congress can assign Article III-type
disputes to non-Article III tribunals.  By very definition, a suit
dismissed on the basis of the case-or-controversy requirement
is not an Article III dispute at all.122  Consider the underlying
disputes in the recent cases addressing the vesting clause:
• In Northern Pipeline, the plaintiff “sought damages for al-
leged breaches of contract and warranty, as well as for
alleged misrepresentation, coercion, and duress”;123
• In Schor, the relevant dispute was a claim under state law
to recover a debit balance;124
• In Granfinanciera, the Court discussed claims for fraudu-
lent transfers traditionally brought at law;125
• In Stern, the Court addressed tortious interference;126
and
• In Wellness International, the Court addressed itself to an
alter-ego claim under state law.127
In each of these cases, an Article III case or controversy could
have been articulated.  Not so when a court finds a lack of
standing, mootness, or an advisory opinion.128
120 Id. at 1947.
121 As discussed below, the situation may be slightly more complicated for
some unripe claims.  See infra notes 141–44 and accompanying text. R
122 See supra subpart I.A.
123 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982).
In Thomas, a related case not described above the line, the dispute was a state-
law contract claim. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985).
124 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
125 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
126 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
127 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
128 See supra subpart I.A.
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One could reach the same conclusion based on any of the
major approaches to the judicial-power limit.129  Balancers
worry about threats to the integrity of the courts or attempts to
humble the judiciary,130 but how could the disposition of a
dispute that the federal courts cannot constitutionally resolve
threaten or humble the judicial branch?  Categorical formalists
draw exceptions within Article III for certain types of dis-
putes,131 but the claims addressed here are not within Article
III at all.  When Justice Brennan connected Article III to the
Seventh Amendment,132 he implicitly recognized that the scope
of Article III is tied to those suits at common law for which the
Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury, but there
would be no jury right to preserve if there was no case or
controversy to begin with.133  And even for the few-and-far-
between literalists,134 a mandatory judicial-power should still
permit non-Article III courts to resolve non-Article III disputes.
So, while a case-or-controversy dismissal takes away federal-
court dispute resolution with one hand, it invites legislative
creativity by removing the judicial-power limit with the other.
In addition to uniting these various factions, the dismissal-
as-invitation thesis also avoids two other debates that divide
judges and scholars.  First, depending on one’s reading of the
Constitution, Article III supervision of non-Article III courts
may be required.135  But this debate is simply orthogonal to the
claim here—my suggested alternatives work whether or not
Article III supervision is required, and indeed the Supreme
Court has countenanced review of some state court decisions
for which Article III standing would not be available.136
129 I would also note that both sections of Article III discuss the “judicial
power,” suggesting (though not requiring) symmetry between the two. See U.S.
Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . . .”);
§ 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . .”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextual-
ism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 791 (1999) (describing a methodology of constitu-
tional interpretation that uses the Constitution as a “dictionary” to define its own
terms). But see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules,
Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000)
(critiquing Amar’s Intertextualism).  However, nothing here turns on this (in-
tra)textual analysis.
130 See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. R
131 See supra notes 113 and accompanying text. R
132 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
133 Note also that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state courts. See
infra note 146 and accompanying text. R
134 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. R
135 See Pfander, supra note 72, at 721–31 (discussing this requirement). R
136 ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).  With respect to Article I or
Article II solutions, if supervision were required (or desired), the non-Article III
resolution itself might create a case or controversy even if the original dispute did
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Whatever one’s view of this supervisory question, it can be
imported into my scheme.137  Second, some of the recent Arti-
cle III decisions have turned on the role of party consent.138
But consent is irrelevant to the jurisdictional question whether
a party articulates a case-or-controversy.139  In addition, when
legislators consider an invitation to authorize non-Article III
resolution, they seemingly would be permitted to make their
own choice about the importance of party consent.140
The conclusory language of this Part with respect to Article
III’s inapplicability to non-Article III claims may require more
thought when applied to the doctrine of ripeness.141  Specifi-
cally, ripeness may pose special challenges for those justices
that treat the judicial-power limit as protecting the integrity of
the judicial branch.142  Non-Article III adjudication of claims for
which there is no standing or which are moot should not hum-
ble the judicial branch.  Ripeness is potentially different, in
that it might humble the judicial branch to take away a set of
cases that in time may ripen into Article III disputes.143  In-
deed, a decision on ripeness might expressly identify the cir-
cumstances under which a premature claim might ripen into a
case or controversy.  The consequence, therefore, is that the
constitutional analysis of this Part is less straightforwardly ap-
not do so. See Pfander, supra note 72, at 724–31 (noting some historical tools R
such as officer suits and common-law writs).
137 The possibility for federal appellate review might ameliorate concerns that
state courts or administrative agencies could not (formally) or should not (func-
tionally) have the last word on federal claims.
138 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942–49
(2015) (“Article III is not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily
consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge.”); see also F. Andrew Hessick,
Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 718
(2018) (criticizing the consent exception to Article III).
139 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) (“While the parties may be permit-
ted to waive nonjurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke the
judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual
‘case or controversy.’”).
140 Subject to due process and other constraints described infra Part II, of
course.
141 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. R
142 See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942–47
(2015) (finding that Article III allows bankruptcy judges to decide cases for final
adjudication with the parties’ knowing and voluntary consent); Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 482–87 (2011) (holding that the bankruptcy court lacked authority
under Article III to enter a final judgment on a counterclaim); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–57 (1986) (concluding that agency
jurisdiction over state law claims incident to adjudication of federal claims does
not violate Article III).
143 See, e.g., Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944–46 (explaining that Congress did not
attempt to humble the Judiciary when Congress gave jurisdiction over the claims
at issue to the bankruptcy courts).
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plicable to unripe claims in non-Article III federal tribunals.  At
a minimum, though, ripe non-justiciable claims should be pos-
sible candidates for non-Article III resolution.144
II
NON-ARTICLE III LIMITS
The previous Part centered on a straightforward idea: if it is
not an Article III dispute, then Article III does not place limits
on its resolution.  This Part briefly turns to an alternative view:
if it is not an Article III dispute, what non-Article III limits are
relevant?
One potential limit comes from the Constitution’s guaran-
tee in the Seventh Amendment that “the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.”145  As both a textual and theoretical mat-
ter, the jury right is not necessarily limited to suits in federal
court, and therefore it could provide a limit with respect to non-
Article III adjudication.  Current doctrine, however, seems to
suggest that the Seventh Amendment in fact provides no limit
in these cases.  The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh
Amendment is not incorporated against the states.146  Further,
although the explanation has not been entirely clear, the Court
seems to understand the Seventh Amendment to be inapplica-
ble in non-Article III federal adjudication as well.147  Even if the
Court were to conclude that the Seventh Amendment extends
outside of the Article III courts, the cases described here seem
like particularly poor candidates for that extension—the Sev-
enth Amendment “preserves” the jury right that existed at com-
mon law, and it seems unlikely that the Court would find a
preexisting jury right for suits that were not “cases or contro-
144 My own view is that, for ripeness, judicial-power “balancers” might adopt a
more fine-grained assessment of the effect of a particular non-Article III federal
resolution on the judicial power. Non-balancers would have no obvious reason to
treat ripeness differently.
145 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
146 See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (“[A]rt. 7 of the amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury applies
only to the courts of the United States . . . .”).
147 In the words of Professor Sward,
The Court has said that the Article III and Seventh Amendment
analyses are the same, so that if the public rights doctrine or the
balancing test allows Congress to assign a matter to a non-Article III
court, it can do so without providing for a jury. The cases, however,
are not entirely consistent with that statement.
Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 1037, 1098 (1999); see also Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunc-
tional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 417–29 (1995).
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versies” within the “judicial power.”148  Even if the court were to
find such a limit, it still does not require an Article III resolu-
tion—Congress could require a jury, and indeed juries in state
courts and legislative courts are commonplace.149
While the application of the Seventh Amendment is some-
what tenuous, the Due Process Clause clearly places limits on
non-Article III adjudication (including in state courts).  This is
not the place to articulate every detail of the process due, but I
would be remiss if I did not mention the seminal decision in
Mathews v. Eldridge.150 Mathews famously adopted a balanc-
ing test for due process, which accounts for three classes of
considerations: (i) the private interest; (ii) the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the value of additional safeguards; and (iii) the
government’s interest.151  Certainly, any congressional or state
response to a dismissal-as-invitation would need to satisfy due
process, but it seems reasonable to expect that (at least eventu-
ally) Congress and the states could authorize a satisfactory
process.152
Many other constitutional constraints on legislative and
executive authority also may be implicated, though those im-
plications are not special to the cases discussed in this Article.
Whatever limits are derived from federalism considerations153
or Congress’s enumerated powers,154 those limits apply to
these non-Article III adjudications.  To the extent that Congress
cannot abridge the freedom of speech,155 impose excessive
148 More likely candidates, I presume, would be cases that fall within Article III
but for balancing reasons are permitted in non-Article III tribunals. See supra
notes 114–20 and accompanying text. R
149 For example, territorial courts and courts martial may employ juries.  Con-
gress also could provide for a jury for policy reasons even if one were not constitu-
tionally required.
150 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
151 Id. at 335.
152 Heather Elliott has explored some of the due process issues that may arise
for legislative tribunals in Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 159 (2011).  My claim here is not that non-Article III tribunals are per se
acceptable under the Due Process Clause.  But as long as due process does not
require an “Article III judge,” a committed legislature should be able to design
tribunals that satisfy constitutional requirements.  The contrary approach would
be deeply formalist—reading the Due Process Clause as satisfied by an Article III
judge only and not by any functional equivalent—and yet untethered from Article
III’s formal requirement of a “case or controversy.”
153 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X.
154 E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
155 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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fines,156 or deny equal protection of the laws,157 it cannot do so
in these cases.158
When state courts are involved, state law also may limit the
availability of relief in these cases.  The Supreme Court has
made clear that states may regulate their courts in certain
ways that seemingly reduce court access for federal claims.159
For example, states may have narrower standing doctrines
than Article III, and those may apply to some federal claims
brought in state court.160  State constitutions, state statutes,
and state judicial decisions may create limits both on the avail-
ability of state courts and on the acceptable procedures and
remedies they may provide.  These limits seemingly would ap-
ply here too, as long as they do not discriminate against federal
actions.161
Layered on top of these legal limits are additional norma-
tive or policy constraints.162  For example, there has been sig-
nificant criticism of federal law’s deference to arbitration
agreements because arbitration may undermine some of the
important values of public adjudication.163  Something is lost,
the line goes, when courts are kept out.164  Without passing
156 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
157 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
158 The Court also has taken an expansive view of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, so even though the amendment’s text refers to
the “judicial power,” the Court has refused congressional attempts to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in agency adjudication.  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751–54 (2002).  These limits apply here as well.
159 See supra notes 77–80. R
160 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
261–63 (1977).
161 See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 361–65, 375–81 (1990) (holding
that a state-law defense is unavailable in a § 1983 action brought in state court if
that defense would be unavailable in a federal forum); Haywood v. Drown, 556
U.S. 729 (2009) (declaring a state law unconstitutional because it prohibited an
inmate from bringing a § 1983 claim).
162 These constraints, of course, may have more or less constitutional
grounding.
163 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforce-
ment by Replacing It with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
771 (2015) (contending that recent Supreme Court decisions have replaced pri-
vate antitrust enforcement with ineffective forms of arbitration); Judith Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2822–25, 2893–900 (2015) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court’s decisions on arbitration have created an unconsti-
tutional system); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78,
82–87, 154–161 (2011) (explaining that recent Supreme Court decisions on arbi-
tration have created due process concerns).  “Public” here has at least two mean-
ings: public as in “open to the public” and public as in governmental.
164 See also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
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judgment on these particular claims, I would simply note that
the alternative tribunals discussed here could be designed to
accommodate these normative concerns.165  These too are mat-
ters that Congress and the states are invited to consider.
Finally, institutional design considerations may augur in
favor of administrative tribunals or state courts.  Any number
of considerations could be relevant here, but I will restrict my-
self to three that seem particularly salient.  First, one could
imagine Congress concluding that certain topics demand na-
tional solutions (e.g., foreign affairs)166 or subject-matter ex-
pertise (e.g., bankruptcy).167  To the extent that Congress
concludes that state-court judges lack the expertise to handle a
certain class of disputes, it might seek to make federal admin-
istrative resolution the exclusive forum.  Second, whether for
legal or historical reasons, both federal and state courts are
somewhat limited in the form that their proceedings may take.
While many bilateral disputes are well within the scope of these
procedural forms, Congress might conclude that certain
polycentric, policy-laden disputes are better handled within a
more flexible process.168  This too could counsel for adminis-
trative solutions.
On the other hand, there may be situations in which state
options present particular benefits for the regulatory regime.
In recent years there has been growing attention on, in the
words of a prominent proponent, “federalism as the new na-
tionalism.”169  Scholars of this “new new federalism” have ob-
served the increasingly significant role of states in national
policy, and they have offered normative support for this devel-
opment.170  For example, the ability of states to experiment and
diversify—and to challenge federal policy preferences—could
spur changes in policy at the federal and state levels that re-
dound in favor of deeper enforcement.171  These options could
165 Indeed, the political branches could make special provision for non-Article
III resolution of claims seemingly relegated to ineffective arbitration. See Clopton,
Procedural Retrenchment, supra note 81, at 13. R
166 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2018) (actions against foreign states).
167 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2018).
168 See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 394–404 (1978) (addressing adjudication in polycentric situations).
169 See Gerken, supra note 28, at 1890; Symposium, Federalism as the New R
Nationalism, supra note 28. R
170 See Gerken, supra note 28; Symposium, Federalism as the New National-
ism, supra note 28.
171 See Gerken, supra note 28, at 1904; Symposium, Federalism as the New
Nationalism, supra note 28; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
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become even more important if Congress concludes that the
states are better positioned to enforce important federal laws
than the current occupants of the federal executive branch.172
* * *
In sum, when federal courts find that a dispute is not a
case or controversy, Congress should understand that conclu-
sion as an invitation to non-Article III resolution.  Of course,
such resolution must comply with other constitutional require-
ments, but it need not rely on the federal courts in the first
instance.173  This conclusion is consistent with the underlying
logic of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement and vest-
ing of the judicial power.  Both of those provisions rely on a
deep-rooted principle of the separation of powers, and so it
makes sense that the application of Article III conduces to addi-
tional space for those separated powers to act.  In this light, the
next Part looks more closely at how Congress (and the states)
may respond to federal-court invitations that take the form of
Article III dismissals.
III
APPLICATIONS, SMALL AND LARGE
A. Writ Small: Spokeo v. Robins
Spokeo is a “people search engine” that aggregates infor-
mation about individuals from a range of sources.174  Thomas
Robins was one such individual.  Spokeo.com reported that
Robins held a graduate degree and was wealthy.  Both of these
statements, according to Robins himself, were untrue.175  Rob-
ins sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),176 which
provides for recovery in cases in which a defendant willfully
fails to follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum pos-
sible accuracy” of consumer reports.177
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1499 (1994).
172 Cf. FARHANG, supra note 49 (making this point for private enforcement). R
173 I say “in the first instance” to acknowledge potential requirements for Arti-
cle III supervision. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. R
174 See About Us, SPOKEO, http://spokeo.com/about [https://perma.cc/
6GAR-2Z8Z].
175 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated by 136
S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
176 See id. at 410; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2018).
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A federal district court dismissed Robins’s complaint for
lack of standing because Robins failed to allege any actual or
imminent harm resulting from the alleged statutory violations:
“Mere violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not confer
Article III standing . . . where no injury in fact is properly
pled.”178  The Ninth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court
granted cert to decide “[w]hether Congress may confer Article
III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and
who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a
bare violation of a federal statute.”179
Following the death of Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
issued an incremental opinion remanding the case for further
development about the “concreteness” of Robins’s claims.180
The decision confirmed that “Congress cannot erase Article III’s
standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue
to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”181  In
particular, the Court explained that Congress could not pro-
vide standing for a “bare procedural violation” or a deprivation
that is not sufficiently “concrete.”182  Whatever these phrases
mean, the Court emphatically rejected the claim that “a plain-
tiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement when-
ever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”183
Prior to the final decision, the Chamber of Commerce as
amicus curiae argued that suits like Robins’s must be barred in
178 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx), 2011 WL 11562151,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011).
179 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Apr. 27, 2015) (mem.).  An impres-
sive array of amici joined Spokeo seeking reversal.  Amicus briefs were filed by
inter alia the Chamber of Commerce, Pacific Legal Foundation, Washington Legal
Foundation, Trans Union LLC, National Association of Home Builders, Ebay Inc.,
Facebook, Inc., Google Inc., IAC/InterActiveCorp, LinkedIn Corp., Netflix, Inc.,
Twitter, Inc., Yahoo! Inc., various media organizations (including Time Inc. and
National Public Radio Inc.), and eight states (Alabama, Colorado, Michigan, Ne-
braska, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
180 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
181 Id. at 1547–48 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). See
also id. (“In no event . . . may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979)).
182 Id. at 1549–50.
183 Id. at 1549. The Court seems more willing to find Congress-created stand-
ing when a state is bringing suit. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007);
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1061 (2015).  As noted above, the Supreme Court may refine the Spokeo holding
further in any number of Article III cases post-Spokeo. See supra note 23 (collect- R
ing cases).
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order to avoid a flood of “abusive class-action litigation.”184
Technology firms like Facebook and Google asked the Supreme
Court to dismiss Robins’s suit in order to stem the tide of “no-
injury suits” and “in terrorem settlements” arising from a range
of federal statutes.185  But a dismissal of Robins’s suit on Arti-
cle III grounds cannot have these effects.  An Article III dismis-
sal only bars such suits in Article III courts.186  Even under the
statute as written, FCRA cases may be brought in state
courts.187  The statute also authorizes administrative proceed-
ings in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),188 and those pro-
ceedings typically permit intervention by private parties.189
Looking forward, a dismissal in Spokeo would be exactly
the type of dismissal-as-invitation that this Article imagines.
Suppose that the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs like
Robins cannot pursue statutory damages under the FCRA if
they do not plead actual damages.  Congress could amend the
statute to provide explicitly for a stand-alone administrative
remedy in the FTC or in a new tribunal.  This delegation would
not humble the federal courts because Robins could not have
sued in federal court in the first place.  Of course, Congress
may not want so-called “no-injury plaintiffs” to sue, and in that
circumstance Congress would simply decline the Court’s invi-
tation.  Admittedly, someone supportive of rigorous FCRA en-
forcement may chafe at this proposal given Congress’s recent
184 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 2015 WL
4148650, at *12–26 (2015).
185 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc., Facebook, Inc.,
Google Inc., IAC/InterActiveCorp, LinkedIn Corp., Netflix, Inc., Twitter, Inc., Ya-
hoo! Inc., The Consumer Electronics Association, Digital Content Next, and The
Internet Association in Support of Petitioner, 2015 WL 4148654, at *12–24 (2015)
(discussing, inter alia, the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Video
Privacy Protection Act, and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
These claims were not limited to partisan amici.  In a symposium hosted by
the Vanderbilt Law Review, every contributor argued that a decision for Spokeo
would stop plaintiffs like Robins from vindicating their rights. See Symposium,
Balancing as Well as Separating Power: Congress’s Authority to Recognize New
Legal Rights, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 181 (2015).
186 Vanderbilt Law Review contributors acknowledged executive branch en-
forcement of the FCRA, see Elliott, supra note 186, but here I am identifying
private enforcement in other forums.
187 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2018) (“An action to enforce any liability created under
this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court,
without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction . . . .”) (emphasis added).
188 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (2018).
189 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018).
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track record,190 but this approach gives life to the underlying
rationale for the Article III dismissal—the separation of powers
commands the court to dismiss the case, yet it also allows
those separated powers to do something about it.191
Another prospective solution looks to the states.192 As
mentioned above, the FCRA permits enforcement in state
courts.193  In states that permit standing for such plaintiffs,
suits could proceed apace.  In states that do not currently per-
mit these suits, state legislatures could accept the Court’s invi-
tation.  Their response could take the form of a special standing
statute for FCRA claims.194  Or, they could permit private inter-
vention in state attorneys general actions, which are author-
ized under the current version of the FCRA.195  Again, this
approach would not interfere with the federal judicial power,
and it could further congressional policy through the states.
The FCRA’s state-enforcement provisions also highlight
another legislative facet of these issues.  When drafting a sub-
stantive statute, Congress has the option to declare exclusive
federal-court jurisdiction196 or (implicitly or explicitly) provide
for concurrent state-court jurisdiction.197  Indeed, Congress
seemingly could provide for exclusive jurisdiction in state
courts.198  My earlier analysis suggests that Congress’s choice
190 See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Drew Desilver, In Late Spurt of Activity,
Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title (Dec. 29, 2014), http://pewrsr.ch/
1y13OnQ [https://perma.cc/SH2G-JX2G] (“Our calculation finds that the 113th
[Congress] just barely avoided the dubious title of ‘least productive Congress in
modern history.’”).
191 See supra Part I (exploring separation-of-powers theme).
192 The suggestion here is congenial with, but distinct from, Justice Brennan’s
suggestion to use state constitutions to protect individual rights. See, e.g., Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495–504 (1977).
193 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. R
194 Some states, for example, have special provisions for the enforcement of
environmental law. See, e.g., supra note 87 (discussing California’s Prop 65). R
195 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c)(1) (2018).
196 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333–1334, 1338 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018).
197 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (discussing the “deeply
rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction”).
198 In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, the Court entertained but ulti-
mately rejected multiple appellate decisions finding that the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) provided for exclusive state court jurisdiction. See 565 U.S.
368, 386–87 (2012) (citing cases and statutory language).  Though the Supreme
Court rejected this reading, multiple courts approved of it, and the Supreme
Court said nothing to suggest that a statute expressly providing exclusive state-
court jurisdiction would be impermissible. Id.  Meanwhile, Congress has, in other
situations, expressly provided that certain federal-law suits originally filed in state
court may not be removed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2018) (limiting removal of
Federal Employers’ Liability Act claims).
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could be viewed, in part, as a choice about the applicability of
Article III’s limits.  When electing exclusive federal-court juris-
diction, Congress is opting into Article III.  But when electing
some state-court jurisdiction, Congress is (at least condition-
ally) opting out of Article III to the extent that states open their
courthouses to non-Article III claims.  Thus, in these cases,
Congress has implied that Article III is not a necessary condi-
tion for enforcement, and instead it has invited states to pro-
vide for non-Article III resolution.
B. Writ Small: Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
“Destined for something big? Do it in the Navy.  Get a ca-
reer.  An education.  And a chance to serve a greater cause.  For
a FREE Navy video call [number].”199  On May 11, 2006, Jose
Gomez received this unsolicited text message from an auto-
matic dialing service.200  It turns out, though, that the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 prohibits unsolicited
automated text messages to cell phones and provides for statu-
tory damages of $500 per violation.201  Gomez sued on behalf of
himself and other recipients of unsolicited texts, seeking to
recover hundreds of millions of dollars.  Perhaps thinking it
had found a way out, the defendant offered Gomez individually
more than three times the statutory penalty, and when he re-
fused, it entered an offer of judgment under Federal Rule 68.202
Then the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the entire class
action as non-justiciable because its offer of complete relief to
the named plaintiff rendered the case moot.203
The concern with this Rule 68 gambit was that it would
allow defendants in class actions to “pick off” named plaintiffs
and concomitantly moot claims of unnamed class members.204
Were this permitted, the consequences for private enforcement,
particularly in cases with large numbers of plaintiffs seeking
small-value recovery, could be significant.  The Supreme Court
ultimately found that the lawsuit was not moot,205 but its opin-
ion left the door open to other ways that a defendant could pick
199 See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2014).
200 Id.
201 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2018).
202 Gomez, 768 F.3d at 874; FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
203 Id.; cf. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2013)
(holding that the plaintiff-employee’s Fair Labor Standards Act claim was moot
after the defendant-employer’s offer of judgment in full).
204 See Gomez, 768 F.3d at 875. See also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326, 340 (1980).
205 Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 674 (2016).
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off named plaintiffs.  The Chief Justice noted that the Court’s
holding applies only to offers of settlement, suggesting that the
majority’s reasoning would not apply to payment of complete
relief to a named plaintiff.206  Indeed, the holding might not
apply to situations exactly like this case except that the defen-
dant deposited the relevant funds with the district court.207
Perhaps more ominously, the Chief Justice’s opinion made sev-
eral references to the non-justiciability of disputes where the
plaintiff “won’t take ‘yes’ for an answer.”208  His opinion also
seemingly invited further review of cases in which class-action
defendants can avoid litigation by rendering the controversies
moot.209
Under current law or potentially under future decisions led
by the Chief, class-action defendants may be able to moot
pending cases.  However, as with Spokeo, federal and state
legislatures are not powerless.  Congress could provide for ad-
ministrative adjudication untethered from the strictures of Ar-
ticle III.  Indeed, federal agencies have increasingly turned to
class-like mechanisms for dispute resolution,210  and Congress
could combine those forms with a relaxed mootness require-
ment to resurrect cases that might have been picked off.  Simi-
larly, states could open their courthouses to these class-action
suits.211  Again, my claim is not that Congress and state legis-
206 Id. at 683 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
207 Id. Defendants have tried this technique in a range of cases to mixed
success. See, e.g., Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir.
2017) (finding the case not moot); Leyse v. Lifetime Ent. Sers., LLC, 679 Fed.
App’x. 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding the case moot); Conrad v. Boiron, Inc., 869
F.3d 536, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2017) (same).  I suspect this is not the last we will hear
of this tactic. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leyse v. Lifetime Entertain-
ment Services, 2017 WL 3500176 (July 29, 2017).
208 Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 683 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  The Chief
Justice used similar language at oral argument when he said to counsel for
Gomez: “[I]f you’re getting everything you want, what is the case or controversy?
What is the live dispute in which you have a personal stake? . . . You won’t take
‘yes’ for an answer.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, 36, Campbell-Ewald Co.
v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. (2015) (No. 14–857).
209 Id.; cf. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104
GEO. L.J. 921, 966–71 (2016) (discussing Supreme Court signals).
210 See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The
Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2035–48 (2012) (noting examples
of agencies using class action-like mechanisms and arguing that agencies should
rely on them more).
211 Although a “putative” class action in state court may be subject to removal
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), a finding of no standing should result
in remand (not dismissal). See Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193 (9th
Cir. 2016).  If CAFA (or a future CAFA) were understood to bar remand, that result
would be consistent with this Article’s wider claim regarding legislative authority.
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latures must respond to every Article III dismissal by providing
an alternative forum—only that they could do so.
C. Writ Large: General Statutes
As noted above, in response to a hypothetical dismissal in
Spokeo, Congress could adopt a non-Article III fix for the FCRA.
Yet standing problems are broader than one statute. A decision
to find no standing in Spokeo (or a case like it) would have
consequences for dozens of federal laws.212  Environmental
statutes have been particular targets of standing dismissals,213
and many more statutes rely on private attorneys general for
enforcement.214
In Schor and again in Wellness International, Justices
downplayed the worry that Congress could create “a phalanx of
non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business
of the Article III courts . . . .”215  This extreme outcome, the
majorities argued, would impermissibly intrude on Article III.
But what if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribu-
nals equipped to handle everything but the entire business of
the Article III courts?  What if Congress adopted a statute that
read: “For any statute for which there is a private cause of
action, a ‘bare procedural violation’ is sufficient to authorize a
claim in any appropriate federal administrative or legislative
tribunal”?216
Generalizing arguments made above, no-standing deci-
sions in federal statutory cases could be seen as an invitation
for Congress to pass a general no-standing statute.217  Legislat-
ing generally, Congress should be able to open administrative
212 See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 184, at n.3 (col- R
lecting statutes).
213 See supra notes 51, 97. R
214 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. R
215 Commodity Futures Tr. Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986); Well-
ness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947 (2015).
216 Professor Elliott seems to suggest that the answer is yes in theory, but no
in practice, because constraining such a tribunal’s jurisdiction to cases outside of
Article III is untenable. See Elliott, supra note 26, at 222–24.  Here I part com- R
pany with Professor Elliott.  Although I agree that defining the boundary line for
non-Article III disputes may not be easy, it is (by definition) symmetrical to defin-
ing the boundary line for Article III disputes in federal court.  For better or worse,
the law of Article III is given.  In addition, presumably any such scheme will afford
some opportunity—in direct appeal or collateral attack—to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the first tribunal or to resist an attempt to enforce its judgments.
217 One might say that Congress would not need a real or threatened no-
standing decision to create such a statute, but of course it is only through judicial
elaboration that terms such as “case or controversy” and “judicial power” acquire
useful meaning.
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or legislative tribunals to all cases for which parties lack Article
III standing—subject to other constitutional limits.218  More
likely, Congress could create some new form of standing doc-
trine, broader than Article III, that would permit more capa-
cious private enforcement of federal law.  Either way, the new
statute could rely on existing tribunals or create a new default
tribunal that could handle all claims for which there is not a
specialized vehicle.219
Independent of any federal statutory response, states also
could respond to the federal courts’ invitations with general
lawmaking.220  A state legislature could pass a statute ex-
pressly providing for standing when there is a federal claim but
no federal standing.  This step would be only somewhat unu-
sual.  In many states, the violation of a federal statute that
lacks a private cause of action constitutes negligence per se,221
and in many areas of law, states create statutory causes of
action that build on federal standards.222  Here, states would
adopt a statute providing for jurisdiction when there is a fed-
eral cause of action but no federal-court jurisdiction.  Again, a
more likely response would provide marginally broader stand-
ing than federal courts, but that margin could be important.
To repeat, I am not saying that Congress or the states
should take these steps, and I certainly am not predicting that
they will.  The point is that they can—and any fair evaluation of
legislative performance should account for the full range of
218 See supra Part II.
219 For an example of a federal tribunal with varied jurisdiction, note that the
Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court with jurisdiction encompassing con-
tract cases, takings claims, tribal claims, and cases from numerous federal pro-
grams. See generally, Symposium, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4 & 5 (2003) (discussing
the Court of Federal Claims).
220 As opposed to non-Article III federal tribunals, these state responses would
avoid the concerns raised by Professor Elliott, supra note 26, as well as those R
sounding in “supervisory” requirements. See Pfander, supra note 72, at 653. R
221 See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 318 (2005) (“The violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly
given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.”).
222 See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 212–16 (1934)
(holding that Kentucky’s state statute built upon the Federal Safety Appliance
Act); Ronald J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV.
289, 297–305 (1969) (describing situations in which state law incorporates fed-
eral rights, obligations, or standards); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of
State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV.
861, 899–09 (1985) (describing situations where states created causes of action
built on federal standards). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Defer-
ence: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s Law, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 243
(2017) (systematizing the distinction between applying and adopting another
state’s laws).
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potential interventions.223  At the same time, to the extent that
Justices consider the dynamic consequences of their rulings,
this thesis might be a self-corrective on aggressive uses of jus-
ticiability dismissals.
D. Connections and Consequences
Whether legislative solutions are writ small or writ large,
they have important connections with the aforementioned liter-
atures on private enforcement and “new new federalism.”
With respect to private enforcement, Sean Farhang has
found that private enforcement is a particularly popular legis-
lative strategy when Congress is pro-enforcement and the exec-
utive is not.224  In the modern American political system, this
describes a Democratic Congress seeking more vigorous en-
forcement in the face of a Republican executive branch that
Congress does not trust to carry out its preferences.  If future
elections again produced this alignment, the Democratic Con-
gress could pass a “no-standing” bill in order to lock-in its
preferences with respect to enforcement.
Burbank and Farhang also found that the Supreme Court,
rather than Congress or the Executive, has been the most
forceful contributor to a retrenchment in private enforce-
ment.225  The no-standing statute has bite on this dimension
as well, as it cuts back on the Supreme Court’s ability to re-
strain private enforcement based on Article III.226  Indeed,
cases not subject to federal-court jurisdiction are also insu-
lated from federal procedural decisions—think Twombly and
Iqbal or Wal-Mart v. Dukes227—that do not apply to state courts
or administrative agencies.228
Turning to states, a reader might wonder why a state would
confer jurisdiction for no-standing federal-law claims when the
state could simply create a state-law cause of action instead.229
One reason would be to insure against preemption.  Any state
223 To put it more bluntly, a legislature complaining that the courts are using
Article III to interfere with important legislative priorities may have only itself to
blame.
224 FARHANG, supra note 49. R
225 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 49, at 1568–80. R
226 See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
227 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
228 See Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment, supra note 81, at 23 (discussing R
state courts deviating from federal procedural decisions).
229 I am assuming that the federal statute creates a cause of action, and the
limitations in federal court arise from Article III.  If the federal statute provided for
administrative resolution only, then it might preempt state-court adjudication.
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law in a field of federal regulation is a potential candidate for
preemption,230 which in turn makes it subject to the Supreme
Court’s whim.231  A state electing to allow federal-law suits
would mean that there is no state substantive law to preempt.
Relying on federal law also avoids many challenges arising
from the supposed extraterritorial application of state law.232
While state laws reaching outside state borders may raise
questions for due process, full faith and credit, or the dormant
Commerce Clause,233 applying federal laws should create no
such problems.234
Yet another explanation for this outcome relates to Con-
gress’s role as a focal point.235  Particularly when choosing
among regulatory standards that seem equally valid, Con-
gress’s selection of any particular standard might create a focal
point for regulatory activity.  This focal point could apply in
federal court, state court, and administrative review, and it
could apply to private and public enforcement at both the state
and federal levels.236  A single focal point reduces transaction
costs for regulatees, who would prefer to follow a uniform stan-
dard.  A focal point also permits formal or informal coordina-
tion among various regulatory agents: public and private
enforcers, for example, can work complementarily to enforce
the same federal standard in multiple forums.237
This arrangement also suggests an intertemporal parallel
to Farhang’s political story.  As noted above, Farhang suggests
230 By mentioning a “field” I do not mean to limit this analysis to field preemp-
tion—once a federal law appears in a field, it could expressly preempt, create a
conflict, or occupy the field. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 52, at 677–85 R
(discussing the various ways that federal law may preempt state law).
231 Indeed, the Roberts Court has at times been aggressive in preempting state
law. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307
(2014).
232 See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008);
Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1057 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, The Taft Lecture: Living Under Someone Else’s
Law, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 377 (2016).
233 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (addressing due pro-
cess and full faith and credit in horizontal choice of law); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982) (dormant Commerce Clause).
234 Other constitutional limits would still apply. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (limiting constitu-
tional personal jurisdiction of state courts).
235 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1963).
236 See, e.g., Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 49; Margaret H. R
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of
Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011).
237 See Clopton, Redundant Enforcement, supra note 49, at 312. R
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that a pro-enforcement Congress might turn to private enforce-
ment when it is dubious of an anti-enforcement executive.238
In addition, a pro-enforcement Congress could see the creation
of focal points as insurance against future anti-enforcement
federal courts239 because these focal points would allow pro-
enforcement states to pick up the slack if the federal courts
interfered.240
The reliance on states also connects with work by Heather
Gerken and others on new new federalism.241  By involving the
states, Congress is inviting states not only to provide outlets for
federal claims, but also to participate in the policy-making dia-
logue.  State choices can influence current and future congres-
sional priorities, and recognition of the importance of state
legislation might give states further leverage in the national
policy-making process.
Importantly, this is all about legislators: Congress and
state legislatures make the major policy decisions, and Article
III’s case-or-controversy requirement does not tell us anything
about what the substantive law should say or who should have
primary responsibility for enforcing it.
CONCLUSION
Article III is a sword and shield.  Federal courts use the
sword of Article III to knock down attempts by Congress to
usurp the judicial power of the United States, while the same
federal courts use the shield of Article III to close their doors to
suits that are unripe, moot, or brought without standing.
This sword-shield view tells us what to do inside of Article
III.  When a federal court definitively declares a dispute to be
outside of Article III, then the Article III dismissal is neither a
sword nor a shield, but a beacon.  The dismissal tells Congress
to “look here”—this is a dispute that the federal courts cannot
hear, and if you want this matter resolved, you are free to use
non-Article III means to do so.  Such a dismissal also tells state
238 See FARHANG, supra note 49, at 3. R
239 On this point, the future may be sooner than we might have expected. See,
e.g., Ronald A. Klain, The One Area Where Trump Has Been Wildly Successful,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
one-area-where-trump-has-been-wildly-successful/2017/07/19/5bc5c7ee-6be7
-11e7-b9e2-205be768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.497ea25eddcf [http://perma
.cc/WST-MTKK] (observing that President Trump “is on pace to more than double
the number of federal judges nominated by any president in his first year” and
that “Trump’s picks are astoundingly young”).
240 Professor Schapiro suggested a similar federal–state dialogue, though his
arguments differ from those presented here. See Schapiro, supra note 8.
241 See supra note 28 (collecting sources). R
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legislatures that, should they be inclined to promote enforce-
ment along the same lines, they may open state courthouses to
these federal claims.
Contrary to those critics of justiciability who claim it has
lost sight of its separation-of-powers purpose, these conclu-
sions suggest that case-or-controversy dismissals have direct
separation-of-powers effects through their invitation for legisla-
tive action.  In response to critics of the federal courts’ sup-
posed interference with private enforcement, these conclusions
suggest that some of that consternation should be directed at
legislators.  And in keeping with recent focus on federal–state
policymaking, these conclusions suggest that Article III dismis-
sals should join the class of structural elements that undergird
federalism as the new nationalism.  Indeed, both with respect
to private enforcement and federal–state collaboration, these
conclusions suggest that Article III dismissals might trigger
action outside of the courts—exactly what you might expect a
separation-of-powers doctrine to do.
